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III. AMERICAN CASES UPON THE LIABILITY OF. MANUFACTURERS AND VENDORS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

The tendency throughout the United States is, with but
few exceptions, to regard the act of sale as terminating all
liability on the part of the maker or vendor of a defectively
constructed article or structure, unless the article is either a
drug-chemical or explosive, and so "imminently dangerous
to human life," or the defect is known to and concealed by
the vendor.
In New York and some other states it would appear that
where the maker sells or provides an article f6r immediate
use in its existing condition, and the defect is not patent to
any reasonable inspection, the maker is liable to one who
may be expected to come in contact with the article in the
course of such use if he be injured, but if the defect be patent, if it is known or could probably be discovered by the
purchaser or him to whom the article is supplied if he properly perform his duty of examination, then the liability, if
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any, is upon him who' with knowledge, or (probably) with
means of knowledge, uses the article for a purpose for which
it is unfit. Much the same idea is expressed by Mr. Beven
in his admirable work on "The Law of Negligence." ' He
adopts the view of Brett, M. R., in Heaven v. Pndcr, that
wherever a reasonable man would, if he stopped to think, realize that unless he took care some person or class of persons
might probably be injured, a duty of care existed towards
such person or class, subject to this qualifying statement:
"To fix liability for injuries brought about through a complicated state of facts, the last conscious agent must be sought.
If between the agency setting at work the mischief, the original setter in motion of the mischief, and the actual mischief
done there intervenes a conscious agentwhich might or should
have averted it, the mischievous agency ceases to be liable.
On the other hand, there may intervene various stages in the
development of the mischief, yet if none of these is due to
conscious volition, the last conscious agent must be sought."
At first glance this would seem to be intended to -convey
the idea that an-admittedly existing liability is terminated
by the mere existence of a conscious, a sentient human
agency, able by action, whether voluntary or legally obligatory, to prevent the original actor's wrong from working
out its injurious tendencies through the normal course of
natural sequence to their legitimate result; the wrong, even
though if not so directed, being in itself efficient to produce
in the natural course of events the injury sustained.
However, it is quite impossible to believe that such was
Mr. Beven's thought. No man can justify, an action threatening injury to others by the hope that some stranger will
volunteer to prevent it working out its natural injurious tendencies, nor will he be relieved even if some other is legally
bound to observe the danger created and to act so as to avert
the particular injury suffered.
In such case the last obligation does not displace all those
prior to it. On the contrary, a new additional liability is
created to which the injured party may look for compensa'Page 6r.
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tion at his election. A man who creates an obstruction in
the highway is not relieved from liability by the fact that
the city or township is bound to remove it and to repair the
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does not do so, it may also be liable, but the creator of the
nuisance remains responsible for all injuries caused by it till
it is actually removed. It would seem quite evident that Mr.
Beven does not mean that the mere existence of a conscious
agent able to avert the mischief releases the original actor
from liability for the natural consequence of his act. In all
the cases which he cites there is more than the mere passive
existence of an unexercised ability or duty to avert mischief.
There is action by the conscious agent without which the
original actor's wrong would not have resulted in the injury
in question. The intervention of any agency, conscious or
unconscious (for a convulsion of nature, such as a flood or
cyclone, is as effective a diverting agency as conscious human
action), may, if it acts and diverts the course of events,
release the actor of liability in two ways; ist. Where the
original act threatened no probable injury, in the absence of
some action by such independent agent, where such action is
necessary to render dangerous an act normally harmless. In
such case there is no wrong, no negligence in doing the act,
because no injury is threatened as a probable consequence of
the actor's conduct, unless the action of the intervening agent
be one which human experience shows will naturally be
caused by the conditions created by the original actor's conduct.3 Such intervention being then both natural and probable, it is within the reasonable expectation of the actor, as a
probable consequence of his act, that injury will be caused by
it. 2d. If the actor's conduct does threaten some injury and
so is wrongful, he is only liable for injuries which are the
natural consequences of his wrong. So if an intervening
'See Woodward, J., Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. iii, page i6. Even if
the United States be liable, "does it follow that Godley is not liable?
By no means. An injured party is often entitled to redress from more
than one wrongdoer, and it is never an objection to his action that he
has passed by the intermediate agents of the wrong and charged the
responsibility home to the author of the evil"
'La.- v. .4tlntic Iron JWorks, iii Mass. 136; Clark v. Chambers,
L R. 3 Q. B. D. 330 and cases cited therein.
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agent does act and divert the course of events so that some
new result is caused different from that which, unassisted,
the wrong was itself efficient to bring about, for this the
actor is not liable. But here again if the intervening action
is itself a natural result of the conditions created by the
original actor's wrong, all that it effects are themselves
natural consequences of the original wrong. The intervening agent becomes but one link in the chain of natural
causation, of the normal sequence of events through which
the wrong operates to effect the injury.'
To return to Mr. Beven's statement, a careful reading of
his treatment of the cases from which he deduces it will, it
is submitted, show that not only must the agent act and
intervene, but his act must be conscious, not merely the exercise of independent volition, but an act done with a consciousness of its effect-a conscious wrongful act. It is the knowledge of the defect or, what Mr. Beven treats as its legal
equivalent, his means of knowledge, coupled with a legal
obligation to utilize them by inspection, that makes the intervening agent's use of the defective article the intervening act
of a conscious agent, terminating the original actor's liability. It may perhaps be said that while no one may regulate his conduct on the supposition that others will go to the
trouble of taking some action which it is their duty to take,
and which will prevent injury to others by his conduct, every
one has the right to expect that others will not act wrongfully and that there is, therefore, no legal wrong in supplying another with the means of committing a wrongful act.

While there is no right to expect positive, affirmative well
doing, there is no reason to anticipate positive wrongdoing.
Where the maker, when he sells, is unaware of the defect,
though patent to inspection, his wrong consists in the-negligent conduct of his business, whereby the defect is created,
and not in any misconduct as vendor, since he, as vendor, is
not bound to inspect the goods he sells. 5 A maker when
'Of'course, if the particular action by the intervening agency is actually expected, or if it is the very thing which the actor's conduct was
intended to cause, whatever results from it is both natural and probable.
'Lo gmdid v. Holtiday, 6 Exch. 76t, supra, page 3o7.

AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAW OF TORT.

341

he engages in the manufacture of articles for general use is
bound to anticipate that others than the purchasers will use
them and will be dependent for their safety on his care and
skill. 6 The purchaser's act in using such an article for a purpose for which it is patently unfit is thus properly to be considered as a wrongful and thus legally unexpectable and
unnatural action by a conscious agent breaking the chain of
natural causation and diverting the effects of the maker's
negligence to a new and abnormal result.
That the act of a purchaser who uses the article, though
known to be defective for the very purpose for which it is
sold, for which the vendor knows it is to be used, should be
regarded as legally unnatural and unexpectable is a relic of
the distinction between legal and actual probability once
common to all subjects.? The courts have been slow in giving recognition to the actual probability of injury as the test
of liability. In many matters the idea that no man can be
legally required to expect that another will do wrong, no
matter how evident it is that such is his purpose, remains
firmly fixed. Where the rights and obligations of owners,
vendors, lessors, and occupiers of real property are concerned, the courts have, as is to be expected from their conservative attitude in regard to such matters, been especially
'Mr. Beven's rule, while it expresses, when properly understood, a
widely current conception of the effect of the intervening action of an
independent agent, wrongful and so legally unexpectable in terminating

the liability of an admitted wrongdoer, does not assist in ascertaining
when the act or omission of the defendant is wrongful, as being the
breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff. As has been seen in the first
part of the article, the rule announced by Brett, M. R., is too broad,
covering, as it does, the duty to refrain from probably injurious
omissions as well as actions, requiring every man to take affirmative
precautions to protect his neighbors as well as to refrain from injuring them. However, in the cases under discussion, the maker of
an article or structure for sale, or one w:.o, as his business, supplies
them for use, is bound to exercise care in their preparation and is
liable for acts of negligent omission as well as of commission. The duty
of care to prevent the wrong is therefore present. See v,;pra, pages
293 ct seq.
Vicars v. IVilcocks, 8 East. 1, 2 Smith's L C 521. An action of slander in which Lord Ellenborough held that the special damage must be the
legal and natural consequence of the words spoken. This rule was
sharply criticised in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577, by Lords Campbell,
Cranworth. and Wensleydale, and is no longer law in such cases. See
notes to Vicars v. Vilcocks in Eleventh English Edition of Smith's
Cases, by Miller Chetty, Herbert Williams, and Herbert Chetty. (9o3)
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tenacious of the earlier and formal conception. The rule
announced in Robbins v. Jones,8 that in the absence of fraud
a lessor of ruinous property is not responsible for injuries
received by one coming on the premises by the invitation or
permission of the tenant, prevails, save, possibly, in New
York, where, in the more recent cases, 9 the courts have regarded the actual probability of injury as decisive. It is not
surprising to find the same rule applied to the cases now
under discussion, which concern so intimately the obligation
of those making, using, or transferring the possession of personal property. Where the article is capable of more than
one use, for some one or more of which, though defective, it
is still reasonably safe, and there is no actual knowledge that
it is to be used for that particular use for which it is-unfit,
this conception would appear to be wholesome and in accordance with sound public policy.' 0 Where, however, the article
ix C. B. N. S. 221, supra, page 275. The reason for this rule is
well put in Cheadle v. Burdick, 26 Ohio, 393 (87 ). "The shelves
which fell and injured the plaintiff," said McIlvaine, J., "were not
erected (by the landlord) in violation of any right of the public or
member thereof. They could only harm those who came into the
shop, and no one could rightfully come there save by the owner's permission and invitation. Persons who are invited into dangerous
premises must seek their remedy against their invitor. There is no
Implied undertaking that the premises are fit for the use to which
the tenant intends to put them. If they are unfit, it is the duty of the
tenant to fit them for the intended use and the landlord may reasonably
expect him to do so." Sce, however, contra, Hernberg v. Wilcox, 96
Tenn. 163, and Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, in which it was held that
a landlord was liable both to a tenant and his guest for a failure to
discover by inspection the dangerous condition of the leased premises.
SShiclds v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28; Fox v. Buffalo Aasoc., 21 App. Div.
N. Y., 32!, supra, page 277; Barrett v. Ontario Co., 174 N. Y., supra,
page 276, though only in cases where the building leased is to be thrown
open to the public for its use.
° Similarly where the contractor has fulfilled all the terms of his
contract, but the article as planned and ordered by the purchaser is unfit
for the use to which the latter intends to put it, if injury results from
such use the purchaser is alone responsible: Mar-uin Safe Co. v. Word,
46 N. J., Law, i9. There defendant had contracted to build a bridge for
the Counties of Essex and Hudson. During the work they contracted
to furnish a temporary bridge. The Marvin Safe Company attempted
to haul over the temporary bridge a heavy safe. The bridge gave
way and the safe was precipitated into the river. The company sued
the contractor, who pleaded that he had fulfilled all the terms of his
contract with the counties. It was held on demurrer that the plea was
good. The decision is manifestly correct. The work: as planned was
done in a workmanlike and competent manner, there was no negligence
therein, nor was the contractor bound to anticipate that the coui,ties
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can only be used for the very purpose for which it is dangerously unfit and the vendor knows that the purchaser is buying it, intending to put it at once to such use, it is submitted
that the vendor having for his own profit subjected the user
of it to actual risk of injury, the courts should, as the New
York courts have done in the Real Estate cases, look to actualities instead of legal fictions and hold the vendor liable for
what he must, had he thought, have realized would probably
result from his conduct.
It seems quite clearly established where the purchaser,
actually knowing the defective nature of the article, puts it to
a use for which it is unfit and unsafe, any injury received
therefrom is due to his misuse and not to the act of him who
created the defect. But even the cases cited by Mr. Beven
do not afford actual support to his view that a duty to
examine, which if performed would have discovered the
defect, is equivalent to actual knowledge of it.
would plan a bridge inadequate to accommodate any expectable traffic
or that they would permit heavy hauling upon it if it were not, as
plam.ned, safe therefor. In no case should the contractor be liable
for injury resulting from the plan of the work, but only for carelessness in execution of it as planned. Nor where by contract or law
an affirmative duty is assumed or imposed should one to whom the
performance thereof is delegated be liable for a mere failure to adequately perform it. The original obligor remains responsible for the
adequacy of the protection afforded. See Winterbottom v. Wright,
supra, page 281 et seq., and note 26, page 284, but where the contractor
is guilty of acts of misfeasance in the course of his work, w'ich
threaten injury to those upon whose persons or property his business
is exercised, he should be held liable for any resulting damage. So a
landlord is not liable to a customer of a tenant for a failure to repair,
even though the lease binds him to do so, the -tenant being bound as
to his customer to have the premises maintained in good order and the
clause in the lease merely delegating the performance, and not transferring the obligation. (See discussion of lWinterbottom v. Wright,
supra, page 282 and cases cited in note 21.) But if he does repair but
badly he is liable for his misfeasance, Gregor v. Cady, 82 Me. 131, so
while a contractor is making repairs for a landlord he is responsible
to a tenant injured by his negligent acts while in control of the work of
repair and executing it: Butts v. Sweeny, 25 N. Y., Supp. 531, 72 Hun.
562. In Cobb v. Clark Co., 1i8 Ga. 483 (ixoa), the court, while correctly holding that an owner who had been injured because a contractor
employed by his neighbor to remove the party wall had failed to erect a
sufficient temporary wall as agreed between the two owners, the court
saying. "the defendant may have been employed to do just exactly what
he has done," overlooking this distinction also held that he was not
liable for injuries caused by the negligent manner in which his servants
moved the plaintiffs' fixtures.
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Hcaven v. Pender," Mr. Beven says, "must be taken to
imply that there was no duty on the part of any one subsequent to the dock owner to test the staging, because otherwise if there was a duty on the part of either the ship owner
or ship painter, the chain of causation would have been
broken." But not one word is said by any judge in the
Court of Appeal to indicate that no such duty existed or that
if it did it could affect the dock owner's liability, while the
Court of Queen's Bench 12 considered the ship owner was
certainly liable; though the dock owner was not, because
they thought that the evidence indicated that the staging had
become defective after the dock owner had parted with the
possession and control, and so the injury was due to improper
repair and not a defect in the thing as originally supplied.
In Elliott v. Hall Isthe court refused to consider whether
the Railway Company at whose yards the defendants' trucks
had stood for six weeks might not also be liable for the failure of their inspector to discover their defective condition.
If an obligation to examine on the part of him last in control
was destructive of any prior obligation as to the condition of
the trucks, as Mr. Beven states, this point would have been
the very crux of the case. Nor is there any discussion in
Mulholland v. R. R. 14 as to whether a railroad does or does
not owe a duty to inspect cars of connecting lines before putting them in the hands of their employees for further transportation. The current of American decision is strongly in
favor of such a duty, nor is there any case cited by Mr. Beven
in his chapter on "The Master's Duties to his Servants" to
indicate a contrary view in England.
In Moon v. R. R. 15 the question was flatly presented. A
brakeman of the Manitoba Railroad being injured by reason
of the defective condition of a car furnished to his road by
the defendant, a connecting road, for the carriage of through
freight, it was held th. the admitted negligence of the
L. P_ iz Q. B. D. 503. Lupra, pages 229, 230.
L.
"L.
"L
"46
"

R. 9 Q. B. D. 3o6, .supra, page 229.
R. I5 Q. B. D. 315, supra. page 231.
R. i8&S, A. C. 218, supra, page 232.
Minn. 1o6.
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Manitoba Railroad (in not having the car inspected, which
would have discovered the defect and averted the mischief)
did not excuse or relieve the defendant from liability. Here,
at least, Mr. Beven's rule is brought forward, argued, and
flatly rejected. Nor oln principle should it relieve the original
actor who has carelessly put forth a dangerously defective
thing that another could by proper care discover the defect
and so avoid a use for which it was unfit, though a use for
which the article was designed and sold. The actor's wrong
in itself is efficient to cause the injury if not diverted; that
the purchaser would use it in the very way which caused the
injury, unless the defect was discovered, was not only probable but intended, and the injury was to be expected, except
on the unwarranted expectation that the purchaser will not
merely do no conscious wrong, but will efficiently discharge
all his affirmative legal obligations.
Mr. Beven's rule operates, as stated, only to terminate the
liability of the vendor or suppliers, when the defect in the
article is known to the vendee, or him to whom it is supplied,
or is patent to an examination which the latter is legally
bound and personally competent to make.1 6 Mr. Beven
expressly says: "If such person (the person last in cha.ge
of the article) undertook in law no duty of examination and
is entitled to hand over the article in the state in which he
received it from someone else antecedent to himself,'the liability for the injury is, so to speak, thrown back."
It would appear that if the vendor knew from the circumstances that the vendee could not examine the article before
it was put to use, as where articles are sent direct to a servant
of the purchaser for his immediate use, distant from the
purchaser, the case would be like that of Devlin v. Smith.
The vendor must know that there can be no opportunity for
the purchaser to discover the defect if any exist and (while
the servant may be barred by his own act in using the article
if the defect is patent to an inspection he is competent to
make) the vendor cannot assert that the injury resulted from
the purchaser's misuse of the article in putting it to a use for
" Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 infra, page 361.
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which it was unfit. The injury results irmnediately from the
vendor's act without the intervention of any conscious
agency.
Where the defect is latent, there is no "conscious agency
which might.or ought to avert the michief." If the defect
could not be discovered by any examination which the purchaser was legally bound and personally competent to make,
the liability is, as he says, thrown back to him by whose negligence it was created. However, the great majority of the
American courts have regarded the obligations and liabilities
attaching to the manufacture of personal property as arising
wholly out of the ownership, possession, or control of the
property, and so terminating with its transfer, the owner out
of possession, the vendor, are none of them liable for the
condition of the article transferred.
The influence of a statement by Dr. Francis Wharton's
book on "Negligence" has contributed perhaps more than
anything else to this result. He says: "There must be causal
connection between the negligence and the hurt, and such
causal connection is broken by the interposition of a conscious
human agency." 17 He then gives as an instance a traveller
injured by the defective condition of a city bridge after it has
been accepted by the city, the defects being caused by the
contractor's negligence.18 "The contractor," he says, "is
Compare Beven's Statement, ante, page 3 38.
" This instance is apparently taken from Cunliffe v. Mayor, a N. Y.
170. In fact, the whole statement seems based upon this dictum by
Strong, 3., in that case: "I know of no case where a stranger can
recover for injuries sustained by the defective construction of on object
after title to the object has changed and it has passed out of his possession and is no longer subject to his control and is in no way used
pursuant to any authority or directions from him. The reason is
because there is no connection between the wrong done and the person
whom it is sought to charge with the consequence. The wrongdoer
is not at the time in control over the subject matter or in the power
or right to remedy the evil. Damage in all such cases arises from the
continued use of the defective subject, and with that the builder who
has parted with the title, possession, and control of it has not and
cannot have anything to do." This statement was much broader than,
the facts of the case required.
By an act of Legislature the city of Albany was authorized to erect
a bridge. The bridge was erected by a competent architect in pursuance

of a contract with the city corporation. The bridge, after acceptance
by the city, was sold by it to a private corporation in whose possession
it was when a traveller. passing over it with its permission, was injured

AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAW OF TORT.

347

not liable to the traveller. The reason sometimes given is
that otherwise there would be no end of suits, but a better
ground is that there is no causal connection between the
traveller's hurt and the contractor's negligence. The traveller reposed no confidence in the contractor, nor did the
contractor accept any confidence from the traveller. The
traveller reposed conidence in the city that it would have its
roads and bridges in good order, but between the contractor
and the traveller interposed the city, an independent responsible agent, breaking the causal connection." Wintcrbottom
v. Wright, he says, is a case where a carriage was defectively built (though, as has been seen, the declaration alleged
merely a failure to keep it in repair), and "no confidence was
exchanged between the plaintiff and the contractor. Between
them is the Postmaster General, acting independently, forming a distinct legal centre of responsibilities and duties."
Now anything approaching a careful reading of the case
will show that the very thing that the plaintiff alleged as the
direct ground of the right to recover was his knowledge of
and reliance upon the existence and performance of the
defendant's contract. Evidently, then, reliance upon defendant, confidence actually reposed in him, can create no duty.
Nor can it matter whether the defendant has accepted such
confidence or no. Such a conception of the origin of obligation is appropriate only to the law of contract, duties in the
law of tort do not arise out of the consent of the party to
by a defect therein. Now here there was no active misfeasance on the
part of the city or its servants. They neither planned nor erected
the bridge, this was done by the architect, an independent contractor.
Therefore the city, had the bridge still been in its possession, would
only have been liable if under absolute duty to answer for it that the
bridge had been carefully constructed. The act of Legislature being
held invalid, there was no positive obligation to perform or exercise
carefully a statutory duty or power. Such an absolute duty could
only arise from offering the bridge to the public for use as a municipal
highway. The bridge having been sold was being used by the pier
conipany and not the city. It was the company's duty to see to it that
the bridge was fit for the use of persons com-ng on it at the company's
invitaticn and for their purposes. There being no misfeasance in qonstruction and no breach of positive duty, the city was, of course, not
liable. In fact, it was a case in which only he who was in possession
and control of the bridge, and using it for his purposes, could be liable.
As Strong, J.,said, "the damage resulted from the continued use of the
defective subject."
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assume them. Nor, in fact, is it true of-one passing over a
bridge in a highway. If he stop to think, which he rarely
does, he must realize that he can only rely on the city doing
its duty by selecting a competent builder and inspecting the
bridge when finished and that for protection from any defects
not patent to inspection he must trust to the care of the
builder. In truth, it is not actual confidence reposed and
accepted that is important, but whether, there being a duty
to take care, there is a right to rely on its performance.
As actual confidence imposed or accepted is legally of no
moment, since confidence can only properly be important
when it is reliance on the performance of an existing duty,
Dr. Wharton's use of the term only beclouds the subject; it
does not aid in ascertaining when the duty of care arises, but
merely by expressing the question in a different form removes
the discussion one step further away from solution. Nor
could he well have found a less happy instance of the absence
of liability than that of the builder of a city bridge. Baron
Parke, a very accurate and careful judge, as well as a great
-master of the common law, gives this very case as an example
of admitted liability.' 9 And Lord Abinger in Wintcrbottom
v. Wright excepts from the general rule of non-liability the
case of a public nuisance created under a contract such as a
defective bridge on a public highway would undoubtedly be.
Here is the idea that no duties arise save between those
who come directly in contact with one another, that the
Longmcid v. Holliday, ntspra,
page 307: "So if a mason contract to
erect a bridge or other work in a public street, which he constructs, but
not according to contract, and the defects of which are a nuisance to the
highway, he may be responsible to a third person who is injured by the
defective construction and he cannot be saved from the consequences

of his illegal act in committing the nuisance on the highway by showing
that he was also guilty of a breach of contract and responsible for it.

In Her:og v. Dougheety, i. Ind. 255, 44 N. W. 457. the court held
that a passer-by on the sidewalk could not recover against a builder for
injuries received by the fall of a building, unskilfully and negligently

built by him. after transfer to the owner, though the defects were
after completion latent. Such a structure would seem to be a public
nuisance, nor could the injury be said to have been caused by the
use to which the owner had put it, but the court decided the case
on the authority of Dr. Wharton's Statement of Wintcrbottom v.
Wright as reported by him. without noticing that this particular case
had been expressly excepted by Lord Abinger in his opinion therein.

AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAW OF TORT.

349

nearest lgal centre of responsibility must necessarily absorb
all the outstanding obligations and liability and that recourse
must be had to it for a remedy if injury is sustained. The
thought appears to be that of a consent necessarily implied to
look only to him with whom one deals, and no one else, much
the same inference which led to the exploded theory that
when a passenger was injured by a collision caused by the
negligence of his carrier and another, his only recourse was
against the carrier in whom he had reposed confidence, with
whom he had dealt, whom he knew, who was the nearest centre of legal responsibility. It apparently did not matter in Dr.
Wharton's opinion that the intervening conscious human
agency is doing just what the defendant expected, and
intended him to do, or whether his act was wrongful or not.
According to Dr. Wharton's statement it appears to be quite
immaterial whether in the city bridge case the city knew that
the bridge was defective when it threw it open to traffic. It
is the acceptance of the bridge which is the human action by
which all the contractors' obligations are extinguished save
to the city. One of the most recent of American decisions is
typical of the attitude of the majority of American courts
towards this question.
In Huset v. J. L Casc Machine Co. 20 the declaration
averred that a threshing-machine manufactured by the
defendant company had been sold by it to the employer of
the plaintiff, whose duty it was, in order to feed-the machine,
to stand upon a covering placed over the cylinder. The first
day it was put in use the covering, having been defectively
constructed, collapsed and the plaintiff had his leg crushed. A
demurrer was dismissed, but only because there was an
allegation that the defendants knew of the defect and had
concealed it.
The court, Sanborn, J., held that, with certain exceptions,
a manufacturer's liability after sale for the defective condition of his product was only to the purchaser himself. For
this.he gave two reasons: Ist. That by the intervention of
the conscious agency of the purchaser, the causal connection
M12o Fed.

865 (igo3).
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between the manufacturers' wrong and the injury to anyone
but the purchaser is broken. 2d. That public policy demands
-a definite limitation to the makers and manufacturers of complicated structures and machines. As to the first he said:
"No one is liable save for the natural and probable consequences of his acts---an injury is not actionable which would
not have resulted from an act of negligence save from the
interposition of an independent cause. One who makes or
sells a machine, a building, or an article of merchandise
designed for a special use is liable to the person who in the
natural course of events uses it for the purpose for which
it was made or sold. But when a contractor builds a house
or bridge or a manufacturer constructs a car or carriage
for the owner thereof under a special contract with him, an
injury to any other than the owner cannot be foreseen as the
probable result of negligence in its construction. So when
a manufacturer sells articles to a wholesale or retail dealer or
to those who are to use them, injury to third persons is not
generally the natural or probable result of negligence in their
manufacture, because, (z) such a result cannot be ordinarily anticipated, and (2) because an independent cause,
the responsible human agency of the purchaser, without
which the injury could not result, intervenes, and, as
Wharton 21 says, insulates the negligence from the injury."
There is no averment in the declaration, no word in the
opinion, indicating that the defect was obvious or even discoverable by any reasonable inspection. On the contrary,
it would appear that after the machine was completed the
defect was entirely concealed from any but a destructive
inspection. To say that the purchaser necessarily ignorant
that it is not perfectly safe is a conscious agent is to confuse
consciousness with mere action.
Whatever may be said in favor of the position, practically that of Mr. Beven, that there is no reason to anticipate
that a purchaser will neglect his duty of examinatio'n and
so will put the article sold to a use for which inspection
will show it to be unfit, where the defect is, as here, latent
= Wharton on Negligence, 2d ed, 438.
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after the article is finished, to any reasonable inspection,
so that to discover it would require practically tearing the
machine to pieces, where it is made and sold, and is
manifestly designed and adapted for the very use to which
it was being put and where the injury was received by one
of the very class for whose use it was sold; it is certain that
the maker must contemplate and intend just such a use by
just such a person, and the purchaser, in putting the servant
to work, is not a conscious agent, for he neither does nor can
know the effect of his act, nor does his act intervene, for it
is both natural and expected and intended that he should do
just as he has done.
To say, as Judge Sanborn says, that where a maker sells
such an article to a wholesale or retail dealer no injury is to
be expected save to such dealer is contrary to every teaching
of human experience. On the contrary, it would be infinitely
more true to say that the dealer is the only person who cannot be expected to sustain any physical injury if it be defective. So in Husct v. Co. it is quite outside of the normal
course of events, if not impossible, that the purchaser should
alone operate such a threshing-machine-in fact, that he
should be personally present at all was highly unlikely. Nor
would the act of the purchaser in putting it to such use be
in any way the intervention of a conscious responsible agent,
diverting the normal course of events. He is not conscious
actually or by legal implication, for he does not, nor should
he, know of the defect; he is not legally responsible because
he is not bound to refrain from using this machine in this
way, since he neither knows nor has the means of ascertaining that it is unfit for use. His duty to his servants is not
to warrant the safety of the appliances he furnishes them,
but merely to use care to obtain safe ones. This he fulfils by
buying of a reputable maker and subjecting it to a reasonable
inspection, and there is no allegation that any reasonable
inspection would have discovered the defect. In a word, his
act does not in any true sense intervene, it is only one link in
the chain of expectable causation through which the negligence creating a dangerous defect must operate and be
expected to operate to work out its injurious tendencies to
their natural and also their probable consequence.
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Where the defect is latent after manufacture, it seems
evident that the maker's immunity after sale cannot be supported on any correct application of principle that an independent intervening agency destroys the causal connection

between the maker's negligence and the injury.22 Such
inununity can only be supported on the grounds that public
policy demands that liabilities continuing after sale are
against public policy as tending to discourage alienation and
place unwise burdens upon manufacture and commerce.
That, in a word, it is for the interest of society that trade
should be fostered even at the expense of injury to private
rights. Sanborn, J., says: "A wise public policy demands
that a definite limit shall be set to the liability of the makei's
of complicated structures and.machines which are to be used
and operated by the intelligent and the ignorant, the skilful
and the incompetent, the watchful and the careless, parties
who cannot be known to him and who use the articles all
over the country hundreds of miles from the place of sale,"
and this limit, he says, "shall be the same for negligence and
breach of contract."
It is evident that Sanborn, J., had in mind the impolicy
of requiring the manufacturer to make so perfect a machine
as to be incapable of injurious misuse. As to this there can
be no two opinions, but there is no need to invoke public
policy to afford this protection. The manufacturer cannot
be required to contemplate a misuse by any careless, ignorant,
or incompetent person into whose hands the machine may
come; injurythrough the medium of such an agencyis neither
a probable nor natural result of anything done or left undone
by the maker. But where, as in the case in hand, the machine
is being carefully used for the very purpose for which it is
designed, and for which, if care be not taken in its manufacture, it will be dangerously unfit, why should the maker's liability be affected by the fact that the person using it and
injured by it is not personally known, and uses it many hundreds of miles away, or because the user is not the purchaser?
' Sanborn, J., appears himself far frem satisfied with the correctness
of Dr. Wharton's theory, and evident!y prefers the view that public
policy demands a definite limitation to a manufacturer's liability.
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If there is any liability for negligence to the user as distinguished from breach of contractual obligation to the purchaser, it is because from lack of care there is reasonable
probability of injury to him, not because of the personal
acquaintance existing between him and the maker. It is this
reasonable probability of injury to some class of persons that
raises the duty of care, not personal acquaintanceship nor
certainty as to the identity of the person threatened. Reasonable probability of injury is the test of proximity as creative
of legal duties, not propinquity in space, nor is the duty one
of mere neighborliness. The duty is not one created by the
contract of sale and so restricted to those party thereto,-but
is a legal incident to the vendor's previous position as manufacturer, a position voluntarily assumed for his own profit,
and so extends to all whose safety must depend on his care
in manufacture.
It may, perhaps, often be difficult to ascertain whether
the injury was caused by the original defect in the machine
or some deterioration in it subsequent to sale, for which, of
course, the vendor would not be liable, or some careless misuse of it. The fear that the court will be unable to prevent
the jury from working injustice if such nice distinctions of
fact are held legally important appears really to be the basis
of this whole conception of Sanborn, J. It is, however, to
solve these very difficulties that courts of justice exist, surely
they are competent to ascertain and give due effect to the
true facts of the case. To deny recovery in a meritorious
class of cases from fear of their inability to ascertain the
truth is a terrible arraignment of the jury system, a pitiable
confession of judicial inability to control the course of justice.23 Paxson, C. J., in Curtinv. Soinerset,24 invokes for the
'In Didi n v. White, L. t 1901, 2 K. B. 669, Kennedy, I., says: "If
it be admitted that such damage is not too remote in principle to be
recoverable at law, I should be sorry to bar all such claims on the
ground of public policy alone to prevent the possible success of
groundless actions. Such a course involves a denial of redress in
meritorious cases and shows a certain degree of distrust, which I do
not share, in the capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in this
class of cases." While the question he was discussing was a different
one, his remarks are singularly appropriate to the matter under discussion.
"5140 Pa. 7o.
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manufacturer the protection of public policy upon somewhat
different grounds. He says: "If a contractor who erects
a house, a manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of
machinery, or a steamship, owes a duty to the whole world
that his work or his machine shall contain no hidden defect,
it is difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and
no prudent man would engage in such occupation on such
conditions. It is better and safer to confine such liability to
the parties immediately concerned."
What he evidently had in mind was the impolicy of requiring the maker to ,iarrant to all the world his product free
from hidden defects, whether caused by his misconduct or
not. In this he is, beyond question, right; but no such obligation has been even contended for in any case save, perhaps,
Longteid v. Holliday. No one has at common law the right
to the use of a perfect article, such a right can only be created
by contract, by. private grant extending only to those party
to it, but every man has the right to be protected from injury
due to the misconduct of others; while no one save a party
to the warranty can complain because he has been deprived
of the benefit of a perfect article or because injured by a
defect which no reasonable care on the maker's part would
have prevented; it is quite a different thing to say that one
who must be expected to use an article has no right to
demand that he who makes it, for his own profit, shall take
care in its preparation so that it shall not be unfit and unsafe
for its manifest purpose.2 5 While it is highly burdensome
to require that the manufacturer shall answer to all the
world that the article he makes contains no hidden defect
which he himself could not by proper conduct of his business
prevent, it is not too much to ask that he shall conduct his
business carefully, otherwise the manufacturer who obtains
the profits from the business is relieved from all liability for
injuries caused by the manner in which he conducts it. He
"The parties immediately concerned" in such case are he who
makes and he who must be expected to use the article. While the
purchaser may be concerned in the defect, in that by it he may be
deprived of some beneficial use of it, the user is normally the only
person concerned in its condition as a protection from personal injury.
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is allowed to reap the profits enhanced by the saving inherent in cheap labor, insufficient equipment, inferior material,
and generally incompetent and careless supervision and management. while those who must use his product bear the
burden and pay the price in insufficient protection to the
safety of their persons and property. To encourage commerce and industry by removing all duty and incentive to
protect the public is to invite wholesale sacrifice of individual rights on the altar of commercial greed.2 6 A similar
public policy in railroad matters throughout the United
States 27 has resulted in the yearly sacrifice of thousands of
lives and injury to tens of thousands of persons, both
employees, passengers, and others. It would appear to
be high time to consider whether this price is not too high
to pay for industrial expansion, and whether those who
profit by the operation of a business should not bear at
least the burden of exercising reasonable competence and
care therein. That such a burden is not too onerous, that
such care is compatible with the profitable conduct of business, is shown by the fact that reputable manufacturers do
habitually the world over exercise the greatest care in order
that the reputation of their products may be maintained.
Surely it is not too much to require of the others that they
shall take at least equally as great care to protect their
patrons, the public who use their products, from injury.
While it is undoubtedly to the interests of society, especially
in a country the natural resources of which are still comparatively undeveloped, to encourage trade and manufacture, it cannot be to the interest of any community to encourage carelessness and disregard of human life and property
therein.
Sanborn, J., sets forth three exceptions 28 to the general
rule:. ist. "Vhere the act of negligence of a maker or

"By far the sounder view is that expressed in Godley v. Carson, 26
Pa. iii, by Woodward, J.,page yi6.
Coupled with an extraordinary recklessness apparently inherent in
the American character.

See argument for the defendant in Blagdon v. Perkins-Campbell
Co., 87 Fed. io9. for an elaborate citation of cases.
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vendor is imminently 29 dangerous to the life and health of
mankind, and is committed in the preparation or sale of an
article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life." 30
2d. "Where the act of the owner causes injury to one
invited to use the defective appliance upon the owner's
premises."
3d. "Where one sells or delivers an article known to be
imminently dangerous to life or limb without notice of its
qualities." 31
The second exception does not in reality deal with the
liability of a manufacturer after sale, but with the quite distinct obligation 32 to take care that appliances supplied for
use for the purposes of the supplier's business shall be safe
therefor. This obligation is generally recognized throughout the United States. The duty arises from interest in
the use and not from ownership and control of the article
or of the premises whereon it is to be used. In some few
cases it is supplied to be used on premises in the possession
of the defendant as owner, as in Globe Co. v. Coughtry,33
sometimes to be used as an appurtenance of the premises
leased by the defendant, as in Heaven v. Pender.31 More
often the article has passed completely from the defendant's
possession and control, and is used far from any premises
owned or controlled by him, as in Elliott v. Hall,"5 Hayes v.
R. R., 36 Szeny v. Rorcll,"7 Moon v. R. R.," Wakefield's

'Sometimes the word used is "eminently," Burke v. De Castro, it
Hun. N. Y. 354, sometimes "inherently" dangerous, Slatery v. Colgate, 55 Atl. Rep. 639.
wCiting Dixon v. Bell. 5 M. and S. sgS; Thomas v. Winchester, 6
N. Y. 497; Elkins v. McLean, 79 Pa. 343; Bishop v. Webber, ,39Mass.
4x;
Peters v. Johnson, 5o W. Va. 645.
31 Citing Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. and WV.;Wellington v. Downer,
1o4

Mass. 64; Lewis v. Levy, Iif Cal.

"Considered at length supra, pages 305 to 310.
56 N. Y. x24. overruling Barrett v. Co., 31 N. Y. Super. 545.
"L. R. it Q. B. D. 503, SuprO.
' L. R. i5 Q. D. D. 313. In this case the defendant never had owned
the defective article.

" i5o Mass. 457.
31 N. Y. Misc. 54, overruling Burke v. De Castro, itHun. N. Y. 354.

* 46 Minn. zo6.
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Adin'r v. Standard Oil Co.,39 Roddy v. R. R.,40 Bright v.
Barrett,4 1 Hadley v. Cross,' 2 Fish v. Kerlin Electric Light
Co.,' s and Thomas Adrn'r v. Maysville Gas Co.4"
Of the first exception Sanborn, J., gives, as instances,
chemicals, firearms, explosives, and foodstuffs. "In all
these cases,' he says, "the natural and probable result of
a sale was not an injury to the party to whom the sale was
made, but to those who, after the purchaser had disposed
of them, consume them." 41
While this is usually true, it is not because of any peculiarity in the physical nature of the articles in q.uestion, 4' but
because drugs, chemicals, explosives, and food are to be used
for only one purpcse, because defects in them are generally
latent, except to expert inspection, because they are generally
sold in original packages, and so are not open even to such
" o50Va. 824. In this case naphtha was shipped in defendant' car
and unloaded by the plaintiff. The valve of the car being defective,
the naphtha fumes escaped and plaintiff was injured by explosion. It
was held he could recover, naphtha if it escaped being apt to work
injury without any intermeddling by an outsider. In Goodlander v. Oil
Co., 63 Fed. 400, it is conceded that a shipper of crude oil is bound to
take precautions to provide a car sufficient to prevent the oil from
becoming ignited by any of the risks incident to transportation or the
ordinary risks of unloading, though in fact the company was not
liable because the oil was ignited by the unforeseeable misconduct of
the consignee in unloading an oil-car known to have a leaky valve
within a few feet of a boiler furnace.
104 MO. 234.

68
34
99
,56

W:s. 28 supra, page 28o, note 8.
Vermont, 386.
N. W. 1o92, S. Dak., supra, page 28o, note a8.
S. NV. 153, supra, page 280, note 18.
."Change
the wording slightly and the statement exactly covers
the case in hand. No p ersonal injury was probable to the purchaser of
the threshing-machine, but only to him who, after the purchaser
had put it to its normal use, would in the course of that use be compelled to come into contact with it.
"If the defect be patent, or the article is capable of msny distinct
uses for the most of which it is safe, the maker is not liable for
injuries received by reason of the purchaser's misuse or unusual and
unexpectable use of the article. So in Towne v. Carter, 103 Mass. Soy,"
the vendor, who sold gunpowder to a child who took it home and gave it
to his parents but got hold of it again because of their negligent custody, was held not liable for injuries received by the chiid from its
explosion, and so in Davidson v. Nichols, 93 Mass. 314, a maker of
chemicals in themselves harmless who sold them, mislabelled, to a
manufacturer, who, by mixing them with others, caused an explosion,
was held not liable to one injured thereby.
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inspection 4T and are intended to be used on the faith of their
labels or their appearance of fitness for their only normal use;
because, in a'word, danger is immediately (and, in this sense,
imminently) probable from carelessness in their preparation
if dealt with by the purchaser in the way in which he may be
expected, and is often intended, to deal with them, and is not
merely possible, if he deal with them
in some possible but
48
not reasonably foreseeable manner.
On the score of a break in the chain of causation, the
act of a purchaser of drugs, etc., in administering them to
others is, if anything, less to be expected than that the purchaser of a boiler or threshing-machine will employ others
to operate it, and if the defect be latent, there is no reason
why he, any more than a purchaser of a drug, should refrain
from any use of it for which on its face it appears suitable.
If injury is as probable from carelessness in the one case as
the other, and that injury, if anything, is usually less in
extent where drugs, chemicals, and foods are sold, surely
the makers of the latter have good reason to complain of a
public policy which arbitrarily singles them out to bear a
burden so onerous that public policy relieves all other manufacturers 9from it, even at the expense of those who use their
product.'
"West v. Eananuel, 198 Pa. i8o, where it was held that a druggist was
not liable for a failure to inspect a bottle of medicine sold by him in the
original package.
"This is admirably brought out in the contrasted cases of Waketlrld's
Adtn'r v. Standard Oil Co., 1o2 Va. 824, and Goodlandcr v. Oil Co., 63
Fed. 400. In the first case naphtha, a highly volatile and explosive
substance, in the second crude petroleum, which is only inflammable if
brought directly into contact with fire or subjected to intense heat
when shipped in cars, having the saine defect, a leaky valve. In the
second case, no injury was probable unless the car was unloaded, as
in fact it was by the consignee, who knew of the leak, so near a lighted
furnace that the oil dripping from the leak would be ignited. It was
held that since s-tficient precautions had been taken to guard against
ignition for ordinary risks of transportation, the company had fulfilled
its legal obligations and was not answerable for injury caused by the
careless conduct of the consignee. In the first case the injury was
caused by the escape of naphtha in the course of unloading the car in
the ordinary way, and the court held consignee's act in removing the
cap was "not only one to be anticipated, but one which the company
knew would occur, for it was necessary in order to unload the car in the
ordinary way," and the company were bound to provide against danger
incident to it, nor was it an intervening superseding cause.
'In Davis v. Guarnieri,4S Ohio, 470, the liability of makers of drugs
for negligence seems to be based on the requirements of public policy.
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In fact, drugs, chemicals, explosives, and foodstuffs are

not in their nature inherently or imminently dangerous. If
negligently kept, if misused, if their true nature is not properly indicated, so rendering probable an innocent misuse, or
if carelessly made or put on the market unlabelled or mislabelled,•10 they may become highly dangerous. But if a
scaffold, a boiler, a threshing-machine, or any one of a hundred other articles is carelessly made and put on the market
with nothing to indicate its unfitness for the use for which
it is sold, it is equally inherently and imminently dangerous. Nor if the quantity of injury threatened be legally
of importance, and it is submitted that in a civil action the
wrongfulness of the defendant's acts are not measured by
the extent of the damage threatened, 5' the latter class usu"The public safety and security against the fatal consequences of negligence in keeping, handling, and disposing of such dangerous drugs is
a consideration to %hich no dealer can shut his eyes. An imperative
social duty demands " care on his part. Owen, C. J.
"'In !Heizerv. Kin6,sland Co., ito Mo. 6os, the court appears to consider that the obligation of a vendor of druis, etc., is confined to correctly labelling his product. "In these cases,' says Black, J., "the articles (drtgs and chemicals) were necessarily and inherently dangerous
and they did not by their color or otherwise exhibit their dangerous
character, and hence the duty on the part of the vendor to make known
to the vendee their true nature. A threshing-machine is not in and of
itself dangerous, and there is no necessity of putting a label on it. It
speaks for itself and discloses its uses and purposes as plainly as
does a hand-tw or the many other implements and machines in daily

use." But there is no warranty as to all the wnrld that the goods sold
are as their label represents them. The implied warranty of identity
can avail only the purchaser. Negligence must be shown before one
not party to the contract. The liability rests on a breach of a duty to
take care in their preparation for the market, and that care of the
highest character. Brown v. Marslall, 47 Mich. 476; Allen v. S. S.
Co., 132 N. Y. 91. That such substances are usually sold in original
packages and that ordinary persons are not able by inspection to
discover their true nature, no doubt imposes upon those who prepare
and sell them the added duty of correctly labelling them, and the
label actually put on. together with any directions as to use contained therein (as in Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper), will determine to what
use they may be expected to be put, but the duty is not confined to
careful labelling, it is to prepare them carefully so that they may be
safely used for the purpose for which either their appearance or label
indicates they are designed. The label and directions indicate their
expectable use, the duty is to fit them therefor. While no label is
needed to identify a boiler or threshing-machine as such, if no defect
be patent its apparent good condition is a practical label of fitness for
safe use, and it is the duty of the maker to make the article conform
to its appearance.
' The extent of the injury, of course, affects the measure of dam-
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ally threatens the greater injury. The injury threatened by
a defective boiler, scaffold, or complicated machine if defective is infinitely greater that any that is liable to result from
the sale by a barber of a hair wash ;* from the sale by a
quack of a patent tonic,53 or from the conduct of a caterer
who supplies unwholesome food for a public banquet ;5 in all
,of which cases the parties injured have been allowed to
recover.
It would appear that these particular articles have been
separated from the rest by a misconception of the earlier
cases. Instances of admitted liability naturally presented
themselves first in these particular cases. Instead of perceiving that they were but the most usual and obvious instances
of articles designed for a particular use for which, unless
carefully prepared, they would be dangerously unfit, from
negjigence in the preparation of which injury is hme,diatcly 5 probable to the public in the ordinary course of
events and is not merely possible mediately through the
medium of some misuse or some other peculiar and so
utnforeseeable action by the purchaser, they were taken to be
anomalous and arbitrary impositions of exceptional liability
peculiar to the physical nature of the article. These cases
were then grouped under a class of so-called ultra hazardous
or inherently dangerous articles.
In the earliest American case, Thomas v. Winchester,8 1
it was held that the druggist's " duty arose out of the nature
of his business, and the danger to others from its mismanagement," and not from contract, and extended to all who would
be as a natural result affected by his want of care therein.
"The wrong was in putting the poison mislabelled into the
hands of a retailer to be sold and afterwards used as extract
of dandelion." The druggist was accordingly held liable for
injuries received by such use, though the user stood in no
ages. The enormity of the injury threatened may cause the state to
take cognizance of the act as an offence against its good order and to
make it a misdemeanor, by statute or judicial recognition.
'George v. Skivington, L R. $ Ex. I.
'" Blood Bahn Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457.
"Bishop v. IVebber, 139 Mass. 471.

'And in this sense of the word, "immine itly."
" 6 N. Y. 497.
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contractual relation to him. Now, the extraordinary thing
is, that this has been thought a novel principle. It was
because of the nature of his business, because unless properly
carried on danger to such persons as the one injured was
reasonably probable, that the defendant was liable. This
liability was as old as the common law, as has been seen, 57
based on the obligation of "every artificer" to exercise his
art right and truly, as he ought."' In Longmeid v. Holliday 5 Baron Parke expressly gives as an instance of liability extending beyond the limits of an existing contract the
case of an apothecary furnishing improper drugs. It was
not because he dealt in drugs, but because, dealing in drugs,
his business was one which imperilled others than his immediate customers that he owed them the duty to exercise care
in it.
In the case of Dcz'lin v. Smith " the defendants, scaffold
builders, having furnished a defectively constructed scaffold
to a master painter, one of his employees was injured while
upon it by its fall. It was held that the defendants were
liable, the defect be.ng such " as to render the article imminently dangerous," and "serious injury to the party using it
a natural and probable consequence of its use." In the same
case it was held that the master painter was not liable
because no inspection he was competent to make would have
discovered the insecurity of the scaffold. 6' Thus the master
"Supra, page 293 et seq.
'Fitzherbert, De novel natiura brevum (1537).

The instance given

by Ruggles, C. J., of non-liability, that of a smith for failing to properly

shoe a horse, was scarcely happy, for as early as Everard v. Hopkins, 2
Buls. 332, they were admitted to be liable not on their contract alone,
but to all injured by a misfeasance in their business. This case seems
the one put in Fitzherbert.
"6 Exch. 671, supra, page 307.
"89 N. Y. 470.
Compare Mulcahy v. Congregation, 125 Mass. 487, where it was

he!d that where a church had caused a scaffold to be erected by an
independent contractor for the use of painters employed by contract
with a master paintpr, they were liable to one who was injured by the
fall of the scaffold, it having been improperly built by the contractor
on the ground that they had invited the painter to use it as a part of
their premises. See Bright v. Bornctt, 83 Wis., pa:e 3o6, where the
defend tnt. a contractor, furnished a defective scaffold for the use of the
servants of a subcontractor and was held liable for injury to one
of them.
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painter's employment of the scaffold for the use of his
employees was without either knowledge or means of knowledge of its condition. His act was then not a misuse, but
the natural inevitable consequence of the defendant's act in
furnishing a scaffold containing no discoverable defect.
In certain cases, one being the building of a defective
carriage, Rapallo, J., said, "misfortune to third parties not
parties to the contract would not be a natural consequence
of the builder's negligence, and such negligence is not an act
imminently dangerous to human life." He seems to have
in mind cases where the defect is known, or at least patent
to inspection, or where the thing made could only be a
source of danger under exceptional circumstances. "Here,"
he says, "the defendant undertook to build a scaffold ninety
feet in height for the express purpose of enabling the workmen to stand upon it. Any defect in its construction which
would cause it to give way would naturally result in these
men being precipitated from that great height. A stronger
case where misfortune to third parties not parties to the
contract would be a natural consequence of the builder's
negligence could hardly be stated." Here a defect "imminently dangerous" evidently means one likely to injure in
the normal course of events without some misuse or exceptional use of it by him to whom it is supplied, not a defect
62
which threatened an injury great in its nature and extent.
3
4
Loop v. Litchfield" and Losce v. ClutC0 show that it is
the probability of injury naturally resulting and not its
extent which determines the liability of the creator of the
' Yet in Swann v. Jackson, 55 N. Y. Supp. 545 (1889), the Supreme
Court. while professing to follow Dezlin v. Smith, held that since the
scaffold erected was only six feet high, though built for the express
purpose of the plaintiff standing on it, he could" not recover from the
defendant who had carelessly constructed it. It could not be assumed
that misfortune to third parties not parties to the contract would be the
natural and necessary consequence of the imperfect construction of
the scaffolding." Now a fall is equally probable from a defectively
constructed scaffo'd whether six or ninety feet high, though the injury
might be expected to be less in extent. Such a decision does not deal
with the imnininently but the eminently dangerous nature of the defect, a

word used in Burke v. Dc Castro, tt Hun. 355 (1877), a case decided
before Dcvlin v. Smith.
:42 N. Y. 411.
"51 N. T. 47&
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defect. In Loop v. Litchfield a manufacturer had sold a
defective cast-iron fly-wheel to a purchaser who bought with
full notice of its condition, and who had used it for years
with safety. The plaintiff was using the wheel for his own
purposes, and there was evidence that he had taken it without the owner's permission, and even that he himself knew
of its condition. It was, of course, held that he could not
recover. Rapallo, J., in Dcz'Iin v. Smith says of this case
that "it was decided on the ground that the wheel was not
of itself a dangerous instrument and the injury was not the
natural consequence of the defect or one reasonably to be
expected, and the case of Losee v. Clide was decided on its
authority." Here no such result could have been foreseen
from the making and sale of a wheel known to the
purchaser to be defective. With care it was safe for
some use-in fact, it had for years been safely used.
The injury resulted either from the purchaser's misconduct
in lending it without warning or in the plaintiff's unwarranted assumption without inquiry or investigation that
the wheel, which he had taken without permission, was
perfect. The maker could not have anticipated that the
wheel would be put to a use for which it was patently
unfit. So in Losee v. Clute the maker of a defectively
constructed boiler was held not to be liable to the engineer
of the purchaser for the explosion of it while in the purchaser's possession and use. The court emphasized the
purchaser's sole liability for the use to which it was put.
But while this taken broadly might seem to be opposed to
Dcvlin v. Smith, although it did not appear exactly that the
purchaser knew the precise nature of the defect, there was evidence to show that he knew that the boiler was not in proper
condition, and that he had given orders to reduce the pressure with the idea that so it might be safely used. In both
cases the injury threatened, if any, was serious-in fact,
in both death resulted.. Evidently, then, the amount of
injury which may result if an accident occur is not the test.
In TPyllie v. Palmenrcs these two cases are cited for the propo-
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N. Y. 248

364

AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAW OF TORT.

sition that a maker of dangerous articles,'as in that case
fireworks,-'could not be made liable for an injury resulting
from the negligent or improper use of the article by the purchaser or by third persons."
The words " imminently dangerous" evidently relate to
the probability of injury, and the inquiry is whether the
normal expectable use of the article will probably injure
some determinate person or class of persons if care be not
taken in its preparation and construction, or whether no
injury is possible save through some misuse of it or from
some peculiai- and unexpectable use of it, it being fit and
reasonably safe for certain uses with ordinary care. 66
In Massachusetts the precise question does not seem to
have been decided, but in Bishop v. lVebert 7 it was held that
a caterer is liable to a guest of his employer on a duty arising
from the relation of caterer to those whom he supplies with.
food. "The latter have the right to assume (" that lie will
furnish provisions not unwholesome through any neglect of
his. The furnishing of provisions which endanger human life
and health stands clearly upon tie same ground as the
administering improper medicines, citing the case of Pippin.
v. Shcpard.69 The duty here, as there, is attendant upon
the exercise of a trade which, if improperly exercised, will
endanger those on whom it is practised." 70
"In Davies v. Pelham, 65 N. Y. 573 (1892), Dvlin v. Smith was
followed, and it was held that the maker and vendor of a -derrick was
liable to a workman injured by its defective condition in view of the
uses to which he knew it was not to be put. The case finally went in
favor of the defendant because it appeared the plaintiff actually' knew
of the danger and voluntarily accepted the risk. Dcvlin v. Smith was
also cited with approval in Swceny v. Rozell, 31 N. Y. Misc. 54. Much
that is said in Bright v. Barnett, 88 Wis. 289, would indicate that the
leaning of the Wisconsin courts is towards this view. Nor is Licutan
v. Co., 90 Wis. 497, contra, though often so cited.
9?139 Mass. 411.

U The caterer not acting gratuitously but for reward, the guests are
not to be taken to have voluntarily assumed the risk of the quality
of the fool furnished; had the caterer acted gratuitously, the guests
would have been receiving a gift from him and would be bound to
assume the risks attendant on the quality of the thing given ,inthe
absence of fraud.

ai 1 Price, 411, supra, page 295.

"At commqn law a victualler was bound to furnish to the public
wholesome food. Such obligation did not depend on a warranty
of quality expressed or implied in the sale and so restricted to the
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It may be fairly said that it is not the peculiar physical
nature of drugs, explosives, and foodstuffs which the Massachusetts courts regard as determining the manufacturer or
vendor's liability, but probability of injury, if care be not
taken, to those on whon the business is prictised; those for
whose use the article is designed and sold. So while in Norton
v. ScwclI 7'an apothecary was held responsible for the death
of the purchaser's servant by reason of the negligence of his
clerk, who sold laudanum for rhubarb, in Tozvne v. Carterand
Dazdson'v. Nichols 72 the vendors of explosives and chemicals, were held not liable because the injury did not result
from the normal use of the article sold, but from misuse
or peculiar use by the purchaser or a third party.
In Pennsylvania, in Haggerty v. Godley 73 and Carson v.
Godley,' it was held that an owner who, to save the expense
of an architect, himself erected a building to lease to the government for heavy storage in bond, was liable for its
improper. construction to an employee of the government,
and to one whose goods were stored in bond in the building,
for injuries received to his person and their goods by its
collapse. It appeared 75 that the government did not know
of the defective condition of the premises, and thus that
there was no conscious negligent use by them of it, though
apparently their officers inspected the building and could
by proper inspection as the building progressed have discovered the defects.
Expressions are used Which indicate that the court above
thought the landlord knew that his building was unfit for
heavy storage, and some stress is laid in Judge Woodward's
opinion in Carson v. Godlcy on this feature of the case, but
this question was not alluded to by the trial-judge, who
simply left to the jury "whether there was negligence in
parties thereto, but from the obligation to exercise his art rightly as he
should.

Y. B. 9 Henry VI "53, pl.37. Roswell v. Vaughan, Cro. Jac.

x96. it Harvard Law Review 9, note 3.
io6 'Mass. 143.

Supra, note 46.
"20 Pa. 387.

"26 Pa. zii.

But see, contra, dissenting opinion of Black, J., 2 Phila., 138.
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the erection of the building either as to the design or execution," and charged that " if the defendant knew it was to
be used for storage purposes he was bound to use reasonable care in preparing it for such use." It is difficult, therefore, to say whether these cases are authority even for the
proposition that he who as owner erects a building for a
special purpose is bound either to employ a competent architect or builder 78 or if he choose to erect them himself to
take care to fit them for their intended purpose,"7 or whether
he is only liable when he conceals a defective condition
known to him and undiscoverable after completion by the
lessee.
In Curtin v. Somcrsct 78 Paxson, C. J., leans to the former
view, but bases his approval of the cases on the ground that
the defendant was owner and lessor of the premises. Certainly the tendency has been to restrict their authority to
the precise facts presented rather than to extend it.
In Elkins v. McKcan, 79 while the article sold was coal oil,
an explosive, and so would fall within Sanborn, J.'s, first
exception, the court considered the vendor's actual knowledge of the defect in the oil sold essential to liability. It is
doubtful whether in Pennsylvania any class of ultra dangerous substances is recognized-in fact, but for a dictum
of Dean, J., in Congregationv. Smith,"° it might be said that
in no case could a manufacturer or contractor be liable to
any third party after sale of his product or the acceptance of
his work unless he has concealed a defect known to him
but latent to the purchaser. In Curtin v. Somerset a contractor had put timbers, inferior in size and quality to those
required by his contract, into the porch of a hotel. After it
had been taken over by the owner and while crowded with
guests, who were witnessing a display of fireworks, it fell,
and the plaintiff, a guest, was injured. The defects were
not observable after the work was completed, nor did the
"Walden v. Finch, 70 Pa. 46o.
See contra, Scarle v. Lavcrock, L R. 9 Q. B.
140 Pa. 70.

79 Pa. 343.
M163 Pa. 561, page 576.

2z.
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owners know of their existence. It was held that the contractor was not liable, because the causal connection was
broken by the hotel owner, a responsible human agency,
adopting Dr. Wharton's statement 8 1 as a correct statement
of the law which Paxson, C. J., considered in accordance
with public policy. Now in this case the defect, if it were a
defect, was known to the contractor and was fraudulently
concealed from the owner, and yet the only allusion made to
this feature was a rebuke to the trial-judge for mentioning it
in his charge. This case would, if pushed to its extreme limit,
exclude liability even where the vendor or contractor by his
fraudulent concealment had led the purchaser or owner into
innocently imperilling human life and property, and throw
around commercial dishonesty the protection of public policy.
However, it may be said that while there was alleged fraudulent breach of contractual duty, it was not shown that the
porch as constructed was insufficient to sustain the weight
of any number of guests expected to be thereon under any
ordinary circumstances; the fact that it fell under the weight
of an extraordinary crowd is no evidence that it was insufficient for ordinary use. That the defendant should be liable
for his fraudulent concealment to anyone but the owner, it
was necessary to show not merely that he knew that the
porch was not according to contract, but also that he knew or
should have realized that guests -would be imperilled thereby. There seems no doubt that where there is concealment
of a defect, not merely known to exist, but known to be dangerous to third persons, the present tendency of the Pennsylvania courts seems to be towards holding the vendor
82
liable to such persons.
In Congregation v. Smith s3 the defendant constructed
a sewer under contract with the city, but so badly that some
time after the city had accepted it the leakage from it undermined the plaintiff's foundations. It was held -that they
could not recover. But Dean, J., placed his decision on the
ground that the city engineer had seen every day the mateMSupra, page

See
C Dean, J., in Pahnore v. Morris Tasker Co., 182 Pa. 82.
163 Pa. 561.
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rial put in and the character of the work. He said, "if the
employer (the city) at the time he resumed possession from
an independent contractor, had known or ought to know, or
from a careful examination s1 could have known, that there
was any defect, he is (alone) responsible for any injury
caused to a third party by defective constructiQn." If this
statement of the lawv be followed, a contractor or maker will
still remain liable after acceptance or sale for any latent
undiscoverable defect which renders the structure or article
dangerous to third parties if used for the purpose for which
it is manifestly designed. 5
In the Minnesota case of Shubert v. Clark Co.,88 which,
together with Dez,lin v. Smith, Sanborn, J.,8 7 considers ill
"Perhaps Curtin v. Somntrset may be brought within this, because
while the defect was hid, after the work was complete the hotel company might by inspection during progress of the work have detected it.
'In Osten v. Aorris Tasker Co., 42 L. I. 171. 17 Phila. Rep. 217,
defendant contracted to build a gas-receiver fit to stand 6oo pounds'
pressure. The first day it was put in use it.burst. Yerkes, 3., said:
"It is impossible to say, leaving the contract aside, and the plaintiff
was no party to it. did* not know of it, or rely upon it (observe the
influence of Dr. Wharton), that the receiver was being used in a
manner or for a purpose contemplated by the maker. Can there be
negligence in fashioning an inert body of iron in such a manner
that a subsequent possessor may so use it as to make it dangerous?"
The plaintiff, of course, cannot show - contract to which he is not
party as creative of rights in him or duics .,- L:m; his knowledge of it,
his reliance on it, if he were not party to it, would not help him, supra,
page 347. But since what he is asserting is that the defendant should,
as a reasonable man, have known that, unless he acted carefully as
manufacturer, the plaintiff's safety would be imperilled, it is the actual
knowledge by the defendant of the use to which the body of iron
would probably be put that is important. Now, there is no reason why
the contract should not be admitted and effective to show this,
just as in Globe Co. v. Coughtry, 56 N. Y., it was admitted to show that
the defendant had retained control of the scaffolding as part of the
premises, and in the many cases where contracts between one party to the
suit and some other person are admitted to prove relevant facts and
not as directly creative of rights and obligations between the parties
to the suit,
A,9linn.3,
kHe considers Shubert v. Clark Co. sustainable only on the ground
of fraudulent concealment of a defect known at the time of sale
and Devlin v. Smith "on the ground that the workmen were the reai
parties in interest in the contract, since Stevenson had expressly agreed
to erect the scaffold for their use." Therefore, he thinks they might
recover, as third parties suing on a contractual obligation assumed
not to them or on consideration moving from them but for their benefit,
as in Paducah Lumber Co. v. Water Co., 89 Ky. 346. In Kentucky,
however, third parties can always sue on contracts made expressly

AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE LAW OF TORT.

369

decided, a lot of bad material had been made up knowingly
into ladders which had been mixed with the rest of the stock.
When the particular ladder was sold, neither the defendant
nor his employee who made the sale knew that it was defective. Thus, while there was something more than negligence
in manufacturing,-in" fact, what might be termed a conscious
misconduct therein,-there was no conscious concealment
at the time of the sale. It was held that the plaintiff, a
servant of the purchaser, injured while using the ladder,
could recover against the maker.
Dickenson, J., after discussing the case elaborately on the
assumption of knowledge and concealment of the defects at
the time of delivery, says, "but the statement of the case
shows that such was not the fact." The defects had been
covered by paint, varnish, etc., although not applied to conceal them. "There was then no wrong (as vendor) in not
disclosing defects neither known nor discoverable, and the
defendant's liability reaches back to the time of manufacturing and putting into its stock for sale an article known to be
dangerously defective, the defect being concealed, and not
likely to be discovered either by any intermediate purchaser,
standing between the maker and the person who might procure the ladder for use, or by the latter person. In this case
the wrong and injury are more widely separated in time and
order of events than where there is concealment at the time
of sale, but this does not change the real relation between the
parties." "He must at that time be taken to have anticipated that it would in the ordinary course of events eventually come into the hands of a purchaser either directly from
the defendant or from some intermediate dealer for actual
use and with the consequences that have actually resulted,
. . . and that any such dealer would not discover the
defect and that nothing would be likely to occur to avert
the danger 8I to which the person who might use the ladder
was subjected by the defendant's negligence."
for their benefit. In New York such right is by no means so generally
recognized, certainly not sufficiently to cover this case. See also Lam.
pert v. Gas Light Co., 54 Io. App. 376.

" Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that no interference by
Arongful, because conscious, user of a defective thing was necessary to
effectuate the injury.
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Neither on the grounds of a break in the chan of causal
connection nor of public policy can this case be successfully
attacked. It is plain that the purchaser could not discover
a defect so effectively though innocently concealed that the
maker himself could not find it out when he came to sell, nor
was such purchaser legally responsible to the plaintiff for
any defect which lie could not discover by an ordinary
inspection; therefore the purchaser was neither a conscious
nor responsible human agent; nor can even a wise and conservative public policy require immunity from the effects of
a conscious use of dangerously defective material in the
manufacture of appliances to whose strength workmen must
trust their safety.
In the other American jurisdictions the general proposition laid down by Sanborn, J., in Huset v. Co., together with
the exceptions in regard to drugs, chemicals, and explosives,
and in regard to concealment by the vendor of conditions
rendering the article sold dangerous for use, may be, fairly
said to accurately state the attitude adopted by the courts
therein.""
The third exception stated by Sanborn, J., is, "where one
sells and delivers an article known to be imminently dangerous to life and limb, without notice of its qualities." This
relates to a quite distinct subject, to the duty of a vendor as
such, and not to any duty owed by him as manufacturer or
contractor? ° Now, while Langridge v. Levy, "1 an action
on the case for deceit by false representations of the quality
of a gun sold for the use of the plaintiff, the son of the purchaser, is cited, the exception does not rest upon principles
identical with those governing the action of deceit.
It is not fraud, "but something like it,"92 that is the basis
of liability. The wrong consists in delivering to another for
"See Appendix.
"See this subject fully discussed, pages 305-31o. The rule as announced by S-nborn, J.,is practically that in Clark v. The Army and
Navy Shors. s:pra, page 3o5, and is accepted with practical unanimity
by all jurisdictions throu;hout the United States.

Carter v. Harden,

78 Me. 523; contra, see Appendix.
"2
.and W. 519, sJ:pra, page 305.
Per Willes, J., in Gatreft v. Edgerton, "such neglect," said Dickenson, J.,in Shubert -. Clark, supra, "amounts to bad faith."
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a particular use a thing known to be unfit for such use. This
is an act of commission, a misfeasance. There is no duty
to disclose the defect where no injury is probable if it be
not made known, but there is an obligation not to consciously lead others into dangers of which they are unaware.
In the action of deceit the liability rests on false statements,
actually made, intended or likely to induce the plaintiff to
act in some particular manner. To recover, it is not necessary to show that the defendant knew or ought to have
known that the effect of the plaintiff's action in reliance on
the statement would be injurious to him.03 If the plaintiff's
action was probable and the injury, though unexpectable,
resulted naturally therefrom, the defendant is liable.
In the cases under discussion no false statement, no
active concealment, is necessary (though often present);
the duty to disclose the true nature and condition of the
article transferred arises because injury is probable unless
warning be given. The act which is wrongful is the delivery of an article for a particular use for which he who
furnishes knows, while the user does not, that it is unfit and
dangerous. This is but one instance of the duty to refrain
from action likely to injure others. As has been seen, it
applies to one who invites or permits the presence of others
on his land, though the permission is purely gratuitous. 9'
It applies though the goods be delivered to the user under
a contract with him 91 or in the absence of any contract,
whether delivered in the course of the defendant's business
and for gain, or gratuitously;96 nor is it necessary that the
article should be imminently dangerous to human life or
limb; if dangerous to a property right of any sort,97 or if
any other recognized legal right be imperilled, the liability
His intention may have been to benefit the plaintiff-in fact, benefit might even have been probable. However, one has a right to form
one's own opinion, and not to be misled into action by false statement
against one's will and judgment, and if injury result, the defendant's
benevolent intentions will not absolve him from liability.
"See supra, pages 223 to 22.
"Clarke v. Army and Navy Stores, L IL, 1903, i K. B. x55, supra,
Pae0arth v. Young, 6 H. and N. 329, supra, page 3o9.
SFrench v. Vining, i02 Mass.

132.
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for the consequent damage is complete. 8 It is here, as elsewhere, probability of injury which makes the delivery of the
article without full disclosure a wrongful act.
In all of these cases the wrong consists in the sale, the
delivery of the article; it is not the original negligence
whereby the defect concealed arose. In Lewis v. Terry99
the maker of a folding bed was held liable to the user who
had purchased from a retail dealer to whom the maker,
knowing it to be defective, had sold it, Britt, J., saying:
"When a seller represents an article as safe for the
uses which it is designed to serve, when he knows it
is dangerous because of concealed defects, he commits
a wrong independent of his contract." This is quite
different from the case of Langridgev. Levy. The particular
plaintiff was not in contemplation as the person whom
the vendor intended should use the bed, nor was any
representation of safety made other than that implied in its
sale for use as such. The case is much more nearly that put
by Parke, B., in Langridgev. Levy, of a person not in contemplation at the time of sale, who does not know of the representations and to whom the gun might be sold or handed
over.100 The case was decided simply because a sale under
such circumstances was a wrong to all who should be
expected to use the bed. The imminence of danger to the
user, the probability of injury to him, is the origin of the
duty to refrain from such an act. The court said: "The
intermediate vendor cannot break the chain of causation
unless he knew of the defect when he furnished the bed to
"'It is well settled that one who delivers an article which he knows
to be dangerous or noxious to another without notice of its nature and
qualities is liable." Gray, J., Downer v. W'elliotgton Oil Co., X04 Mass.
64; also Farrant v. Barnes, it C. B. N. S. 553, where a shipper who

had delivered to carrier a carboy of vitriol without notice was held
liable to a servant of the carrier. See also Culler v. Hamnlin, 147 Mass.
471, where a landlord, who leased a house knowing that the drains
were bad and that the previous tenant had died of diphtheria, was
liable to both the tenant and his family for failing to disclose these
facts to the lessee.

See also Miller v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477; Suther-

land v. Cowen, 145 Mass. 363.
niii Cal. 39.
'In
Cart'r v. Harden, 78 Me. 528. this very case arose, and the
action being brought in deceit was held not to lie, a decision contrary

to the overwhelming weight of English and American authority.
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the ultimate vendee." Here is a denial of Wharton's idea,
that the first vendee always forms a new responsible agency,
breaking the causal connection, a recognition of the principle that normal conduct of a human being such as is to be
expected to result from the actor's wrong is but an expectable agency effectuating the natural results thereof. Where
the defendant is not the maker, but only .the vendor, there
can be no wrong unless in the sale itself. 01 If there is, as
would appear to be, a duty on a manufacturer for gain of
goods dangerous for their normal use, unless carefully made
"to exercise their art rightly as they should," and such goods
are carelessly made, concealment is not necessary, there is a
wrong already. If, then, the defect created by the maker's
misconduct is latent, though unknown to both, the intermediate vendor could no more break the causal connection
in the one case than the other; there is no reason to expect
that the vendee will refrain from selling again or using it in
any way for which a perfect article of the sort may be safely
used.
As to one subject the English and American courts are
at one. One who, under contract with another, has furnished
information is not responsible to a third party who relies
upon it, even though it were known that the very object of
obtaining the information was to furnish a basis for the
very action which the third party has taken in reliance upon
it. Knowledge of the falsity of the information in such case
is essential to recovery. Lievre v. Gould,10 2 Bank v. Ward,103
Gordo; v. Livizngston,'"Kahl v. Love 0 5 and Houseman v.
GirardBank.1 0 6
The analogies of the law of deceit and the high regard
paid to freedom of speech in the absence of fraud have probably contributed largely to this result. Were the information gratuitously given and acted upon with knowledge that
such was the case, all that one acting upon it could fairly
' Longmeid v. Holliday, Langridge v. Levy, Elkins v. McKean, so in

such case fraud or concealment is essential.
I" L. X, i803, 1 0. B. D. 491.
i ioo U. S. 195, though against a strong dissent of Waite, C. J.,
Swayne and Bradley, JJ.
12 Mo. App. 267.
',37 N. Y. L 8.

S1 Pa. 25&
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107
ask would be honest belief on the part of the informant.
But where the defendant makes a business of furnishing
such information and professes special skill therein, it is
submitted that he should answer to all who may be expected
to rely on his competence for negligence in his business.
Perhaps it may be said that in such case no man has a
right to act, without personal investigation, upon information not directly furnished to him and paid for by him. But
here the defendant was paid to furnish him this very information, and the case'-would seem to be similar to the case
of Sheppard v. Pippin,1°s and accountants would be the last
to claim that their reports were usually so inaccurate that
one who trusted them would have only his own folly to
blame if injured thereby.
However, the law seems, whether because of the supposed
analogies to the law of deceit or because the business of
accountants, etc., who furnish infornation for the use of
the public generally is a modern growth, firmly established
that the business of furnishing information stands on a different plane from all other businesses, and that those engaging therein owe no duty to any save those who personally
employ them.

APPENDIX.
In Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. 195, while the precise point involved was,
whether, in the absence of fraud, an attorney, employed by an alleged
owner to examine his title, was liable to the purchaser who had bought
in reliance on his certificate that it was good, the United States Supreme
Court laid down in general terms the proposition that "where the wrongful act is not immediately dangerous to the lives of others (evidently
here the court has in mind the sale of drugs, etc.) the negligent party,
unless he is a public agent in the performance of some duty, is generally
liable only to the party with whom he contracted and on the ground that
negligence is a breach of the contract: ' Clifford, J. He says, however,
that cases of " fraud and collusion constitute exceptions to that rule."
In Brogdon v. Pcrkinr-Campbell Co., 87 Fed. iog, the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Third Circuit decided that where a husband had
' Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. N. S. 194. Here an attorney gave some
information in regard.to a client's deed to an outsider in answer to a
"casual inquiry:' Here, indeed, he was not paid to give such information,
nor did he know that the outsider intended to act upon it. He certainly
was not paid to furnish information for the outsider to act upon. This
case is strikingly similar to Kahl v. Love, supra.
1. 1x Price, 411, UlPro, page 295.
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ordered a sidesaddle of special design and of the best quality of material and workmanship for his wife's use the maker was not liable for
injuries received by the wife through defects in the saddle due to bad
workmanship, and in Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, 57 C. C. A. r, Judge
Sanborn's statement of the law was accepted fully and crude petroleum
was held not to be an inherently imminently dangerous substance.
In Georgia the general immunity of manufacturers after sale is
broadly stated in many cases, though the precise point is not actually
decided, Cobb. v. Co., nI8 Ga. 480, dealing with the obligation of
a subcontractor performing a contractual duty assumed by his employer; Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, announcing the exceptional liability
of the maker of a patent medicine to take care that it is fit to
be taken in such doses as are prescribed on the label; Smith v. Hardware Co., too Ga. 163, deciding a vendor of cartridges to be one dealing
in ultra hazardous articles and liable for injuries received from illfitting cartridges sold by him, and Woodward v. Miller, Iag Ga. 618,
deciding that a vendor who knowingly sells a defective buggy to a
city for the use of its emplbyees is liable to the latter for injuries
received by them.
In Ohio, Cheadle v. Burdick, 26 Ohio, 393, actually decides only
that a landlord is not liable to the customer of a tenant for the internal
condition of the premises, but in the case of Bailey v. Gas. Co., 4 Ohio
Cir. Ct. R. 471, it was cited as authority for the proposition that a
vendor or contractor after transfer of possession and control is only
liable where there is concealment of a known defect of work, or
where the article is "in its nature imminently dangerous, and not
where it may merely become so by the manner in which it is constructed
or performed," Haynes, J., and Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio, 470,
places the obligation of makers and vendors of drugs, etc., upon the
requirements of public policy based on the dangerous nature of the
article.
In Indiana, in Herzog v. Dougherty, 145 Ind. 255, it was held that
a builder was not liable to one injured upon the highway by the fall
of a defectively constructed wall accepted by the owner years before,
following verbatim Dr. Whlarton's statement, supra, page 346, as law,
and in Binford v. Johnson, 82 Ind. 426, and Gartin v. Meredith, x53
Ind. 6, one selling ammunition to children was held to be guilty of
actionable negligence though not wilful wrong.
In Missouri, in the case of Heizer v. Kingsland Co., n1o Mo. 605, the
court fully adopted the rule of makers' immunity after sale and held
a threshing-machine not to be in its nature inherently dangerous. Ia
Lampert v. Co., 14 Mo. App. 376, however, an exception was recognized
based on Lord Abinger's dictum in WVinterbotto,;i v. Wright that "where
a party becomes responsible to the public by undertaking a public duty,
in the case in hand a duty to maintain the gas lamps of a city, he
is liable though the injury may have arisen from.the negligence of a
servant or agent."
In Michigan Judge Cooley's opinion in Necker v. H.,-vey, 49 Mich.
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517, is generally accepted as settling the law in favor of the maker's
immunity after sale, but the point was not actually involved, for the
elevator was still in the possession of its maker when the injury
occurred and he was held liable. So, too, in the Wisconsin case of
Zuman v. Elev'ator Co., 9o Wis. 497, the elevator was in the maker's
possession and control, but he was held not liable because the plaintiff
was not upon the elevator but in a room some distance off-in a
word, because he was outside the radius of any probable injurious
effects of the defendant's conduct, and so no duty was oving to him.
This case in no way supports Wharton's rule, though often cited for
that purpose, and in Bright v. Barnett, 88 Wis. 299, a case in
many ways similar to Dev lin v. Smith, the court said the scaffold
builder, a contractor, would be liable to a servant of a subcontractor
whose duties took him thereon either on the ground of invitation to
use it (on defendant's business?) or of imminence of danger if care
were not taken, as in Dez,lin v. Smith. Imminent danger here evidently
is used as in the New York cases in the sense of danger inherently
probable in the ordinary course of events--if the structure be used for
its manifest purpose.
While the point has not been definitely decided in New Jersey, the
tendency of the courts as indicated by dicta in Kahl v. Love, 37 N. J. L
8, and Marvin v. Ward, 46 N. J. L i9, is towards the views expressed
by Sanborn, J., in Huset v. Co.
In Maine much that is said in Carter v. Harden, 78 Me. 528, indicates
that it is only where a deadly poison is mislabelled as a harmless
drug or a false statement is knowingly made with intent that the
plaintiff shall act upon it that the maker or vendor of a defective
article is liable for injuries sustained by any other than the purchaser.
In South Dakota, in Fish v. Kcrlin-Gray Co., 99 N. NV. Rep. io92,
there is a dictum to the effect that after the defective article "has
been delivered to and accepted by the party who was operating the
same and the party injured was a third party having no connection
with the (maker) and to whom the (maker) owed no duty," he is not
liable.
In Iowa, in Ives v. Weldon, 114 Ia. 476, it was held that under a
section of the code providing that no gasoline shnuld be sold unless
so labelled, a child who was injured by -the explosion of gasoline
which she thought was petroleum and was using as fuel could recover
against the dealer who sold it unmarked to her father, though he
had left it within her reach. Compare Towne v. Carter,i03 Mass. 507.
In Maryland, in the case of the State for use Hartlove v. Fox, 79
Md. 514, the court, Boyd, J., after an exhaustive examination of the
authorities hold that while the maker and vendor of an article are under
no obligations assumed by contract or imposed by public policy to anyone but the purchaser unless the article is "necessarily dangerous"
to those using it, one who knowihgly sells a horse infected with glanders is liable for the death of a brother of the purchaser who attended
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the horse. It is, perhaps, uncertain whether the word "necessarily dangerous" is intended to include only judge Sanborn's specific so-called
ultra hazardous substances, or any article which in its normal necessary use will be dangerous unless carefully constructed and prepared.
In Virginia the court, Buchanan, J., appears to lean towards the
New York view, though the precise point was not involved. He quotes
with apparent approval the statement in the American and English
Enc., page 661: "Where there has been negligence in the construction
or preparation of the article sold or supplied-that is, where, under the
circumstances, injuries to the other contracting parties or to third
parties might reasonably be expected as a result of defects or errors
therein, the question of privity of contract seems wholly immaterial."
In West Virginia, in Peters v. Johnson, So W. Va. 645, while a
vendor was held liable for selling poison as a harmless medicine, it
was solely because of "the frightful dangers lurking in drugs, poisons,
and medicines."
In Kentucky, in Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Co., 89
Ky. 340, the plaintiff was allowed to recover because its property was
burnt owing to the insufficient supply of water which the defendant
supplied under its contract with the city, but upon the ground that
the contract was made by the city for the benefit of the citizens,
Kentucky having adopted the principle that third parties may sue on
contracts made for their benefit.
In Rhode Island, in McCaffery v. Mossberg Co., 23 R. I. 38t, the
court, Stiness, C. J., says: " W here the cause of the injury is not in
its nature imminently dangerous (and by this the court appears to mean
not a drug, chemical, or explosive), where it does not depend on fraud,
concealment, or implied invitation, and where the plaintiff is not in
privity of contract with the defendant, an action of negligence will not
lie." See Slattery v. Colgate, accord. 55 At!. Rep. 639.
In California, in Lewis v. Terry, ii Cal. 39, Britt, J., says: "The
fact that a folding bed is not ordinarily" (i. e. if properly made)
"a dangerous instrumentality is of no moment in this case. If mere
non-feasance" (nrobably lack of inspection) "or perhaps misfeasance"
(carele3sness in manufacture) "was the extent of the wrong, that consideration would be important." The question appears thus left open
whether the maker of a defective article, dangerous because of the
defect, though, if properly made, safe for its normal natural use, is
liable for the negligent conduct of his business causing the defect.
In Texas, in Oil Co. v. Davis, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 5o8, it is held that a
vendor of articles inherently dangerous to human life is bound to notify
the purchaser of the dangerous qualities of the article.
In Washington, in Weiser v. Holzman, 33 Wash. 87 (i9o3), a complaint alleging that the defendant had sold champagne cider, known by
him to be so bottled as to be explosive, without giving notice to the
purchaser of its true nature, the vendor was held liable to a third
party injured by its explosion.

Francis H. Bohlen.

